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The Growing Power of Healthcare Ethics Committees Heightens Due
Process Concerns
Abstract
Complex ethical situations, such as end-of-life medical treatment disputes, occur on a regular basis in
healthcare settings. Healthcare ethics committees (HECs) have been a leading dispute resolution forum for
many of these conflicts. But while the function of HECs has evolved from mediation to adjudication, the form
of HECs has not evolved to adapt to this expanded and more consequential function.
HECs are typically multidisciplinary groups comprised of representatives from different departments of the
healthcare facility: medicine, nursing, law, pastoral care, and social work, for example. HECs were established
to support and advise patients, families, and caregivers as they work together to find solutions for delicate
circumstances.
HECs generally have been considered to play a mere advisory, facilitative role. But, increasingly, HECs have
been playing a decision making role. Both in law and in practice, state governments and healthcare facilities
have been giving HECs more authority to adjudicate conflicts and more responsibility for making treatment
decisions. For example, HECs sometimes make decisions on behalf of incapacitated patients with no friends
or family. Other times, HECs adjudicate medical treatment disputes between providers and the patient or
patient’s family.
Unfortunately, HECs are not up to this task. They are not ready to evolve from being mere advisers to being
deciders. HECs are overwhelmingly intramural bodies. That is, they are comprised of professionals employed
directly or indirectly by the very same institution whose decision the HEC adjudicates. But a lack of neutrality
and independence is not the only problem. HECs typically also lack sufficient diversity, composition, training,
and resources. Consequently, HECs make decisions that suffer from risks of corruption, bias, carelessness, and
arbitrariness.
In prior published work, I have argued that the adjudicatory authority of HECs be relocated to a multi-
institutional HEC. Thereby, no single institution’s HEC would have a controlling voice in the adjudication of
its own dispute. A multi-institutional HEC preserves the expertise and extrajudicial nature of HECs. But in
contrast to an intramural HEC, a multi-institutional HEC possesses better resources, a greater diversity of
perspectives, and the neutrality and independence required by due process.
In this Article, my primary objective is not to further articulate this or any other solution. Instead, the
objective of this Article is to further articulate the problem. As the power of HECs grows, concern over HEC
fairness grows. There is a direct and positive correlation between the power of HECs and the importance of
developing a fairer dispute resolution mechanism that better accords with procedural due process. In short,
because we are giving HECs more authority, we must demand more accountability.
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Complex ethical situations, such as end-of-life medical treat-
ment disputes, occur on a regular basis in healthcare settings.'
Healthcare ethics committees (HECs) have been a leading dispute
resolution forum for many of these conflicts. But while the func-
tion of HECs has evolved from mediation to adjudication, the form
of HECs has not evolved to adapt to this expanded and more con-
sequential function.
HECs are typically multidisciplinary groups comprised of rep-
resentatives from different departments of the healthcare facility:
medicine, nursing, law, pastoral care, and social work, for exam-
ple.2 HECs were established to support and advise patients, fami-
lies, and caregivers as they work together to find solutions for
delicate circumstances.
HECs generally have been considered to play a mere advisory,
facilitative role.3 But, increasingly, HECs have been playing a de-
cision-making role.4 In both law and practice, state governments
* Director of the Health Law Institute and Associate Professor of Law, Hamline University
School of Law; Adjunct Associate Professor, Alden March Bioethics Institute, Albany Medical
College; Network Fellow, Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, Harvard University. The author
prepared this Article as part of his participation in this Journal's November 18, 2013 Symposium,
Bioethics, Health Policy, and Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Age of Obamacare.
1 See, e.g., Terrah J. Paul Olson et al., Surgeon Reported Conflict with Intensivists about
Postoperative Goals of Care, 148 JAMA SURGERY 29, 29 (2013) ("(M]ore than 70% of ICU
clinicians report experiencing conflict weekly."); John M. Luce & Douglas B. White, The Pres-
sure to Withhold or Withdraw Life-sustaining Therapy from Critically Ill Patients in the United
States, 175 AM. J. RESPIRATORY & CRITICAL CARE MED. 1104, 1104-07 (2007)
("[D]isagreements between families and clinicians on end-of-life care are commonplace in the
United states."); Keith M. Swetz et al., Report of 255 Clinical Ethics Consultations and Review of
the Literature, 82 MAYO CLINIC PRoc. 686, 689-90 (2007) (finding that futility disputes are one
of the primary reasons for hospital ethics consultations); Thaddeus Mason Pope, Surrogate Selec-
tion: An Increasingly Viable, but Limited, Solution to Intractable Futility Disputes, 3 ST. Louis U.
J. HEALTH L. & PoL'Y 183, 203-04 (2010) (collecting studies).
2 Thaddeus Mason Pope, Multi-Institutional Healthcare Ethics Committees: the Procedurally
Fair Internal Dispute Resolution Mechanism, 31 CAMPBELL L. REV. 257, 259-74 (2009).
3 Id. at 270.
4 See infra Section II.
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and healthcare facilities have been giving HECs more authority to
adjudicate conflicts and more responsibility for making treatment
decisions. For example, HECs sometimes make decisions on be-
half of incapacitated patients lacking friends and family. Other
times, HECs adjudicate medical treatment disputes between prov-
iders and the patient or patient's family.
Unfortunately, HECs are not up to this task. They are not
ready to evolve from being mere advisers to being deciders. HECs
are overwhelmingly intramural bodies. That is, they are comprised
of professionals employed directly or indirectly by the very same
institution whose decision the HEC adjudicates. But a lack of neu-
trality and independence is not the only problem. HECs typically
also lack sufficient diversity, composition, training, and resources.
Consequently, HECs make decisions that suffer from risks of cor-
ruption, bias, carelessness, and arbitrariness.
In prior published work, I have argued that the adjudicatory
authority of HECs should be relocated to a multi-institutional
HEC.6 Thereby, no single institution's HEC would have a control-
ling voice in the adjudication of its own dispute. A multi-institu-
tional HEC preserves the expertise and extrajudicial nature of
HECs. But in contrast to an intramural HEC, a multi-institutional
HEC possesses better resources, a greater diversity of perspectives,
and the neutrality and independence required by due process.
In this article, my primary objective is not to further articulate
this or any other solution. Instead, the objective of this article is to
further articulate the problem.7 As the power of HECs grows, con-
cern over HEC fairness grows. There is a direct and positive corre-
lation between the power of HECs and the importance of
developing a fairer dispute resolution mechanism that better ac-
cords with procedural due process. In short, because we are giving
HECs more authority, we must demand more accountability.
5 Pope, supra note 2, at 274-300; Thaddeus Mason Pope, Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
for Intractable Medical Futility Disputes, 58 N.Y. L. ScH. L. REV. 347 (2013).
6 Pope, supra note 2, at 302-32.
7 It is important to expand on the scope and nature of the problem for two reasons. First,
my earlier articulations were rather succinct. See, e.g., id. at 270-71, 302; Thaddeus Mason Pope,
Legal Briefing: Healthcare Ethics Committees, 22 J. CLINICAL ETHIcs 74, 83-85 (2011). Second,
there have been material new developments over the past five years. The trend toward ex-
panded HEC decision making has continued. See infra Section II. Consequently, there is even
more reason to examine the due process attributes of HECs today than there was in 2009 or
2011.
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II. GROWING POWER OF HEALTHCARE ETHICS COMMITI'EES
In 1984, University of Texas law professor John Robertson de-
veloped an organizational framework for healthcare ethics commit-
tees.' Robertson's framework has two dimensions. First, it is
either optional or mandatory to consult the HEC. Second, it is ei-
ther optional or mandatory to follow the HEC's advice.
The traditional and classic model is optional-optional. A
healthcare provider need not consult an HEC. And if the provider
does (voluntarily) consult an HEC, she or he need not follow the
HEC's recommendation (assuming one is made). Indeed, even to-
day, most HECs remain optional-optional, which appropriately
leaves treatment decisions to the joint decision making of physi-
cians and patients (or their surrogates).' But there has been signif-
icant movement to optional-mandatory, to mandatory-optional,
and even to mandatory-mandatory models.
The mandatory-optional model might be analogized to court-
ordered mediation, in which the disputing parties must engage the
mediator but ultimately need not follow the mediator's recommen-
dations."o Mediation is often mandated in child custody and visita-
tion decisions, because it has been proven effective in those
contexts." Similarly, the use of HECs is often mandated, because
HECs have been successful in achieving consensus and informally
resolving treatment conflicts.12
In New York, for example, if an attending physician has deter-
mined that a patient lacks decision-making capacity and the practi-
tioner consulted for a concurring determination disagrees, then the
matter must be referred to an HEC if it cannot be resolved other-
wise.' 3 But while referral and submission are mandatory, compli-
ance with the HEC's decision is optional.
8 John A. Robertson, Committees as Decision Makers: Alternative Structures and Responsi-
bilities, in RONALD E. CRANFORD & A. EDWARD DOUDERA, INSTITUTIONAL ETHICS COMMIT-
TEES AND HEALTH CARE DECISION MAKING 85 (1984).
9 Pope, supra note 7, at 82.
10 David C. Albalah & Jesse D. Steele, For Business Dispute Solutions, Process Matters, 11
CARDOZO J. CONFLICr RESOL. 385, 393 (2010) ("Mediation by definition is non-binding; the
third-party neutral cannot force anyone to do anything.").
11 See Sandra J. Perry, Tanya M. Marcum & Charles R. Stoner, Stumbling Down the Court-
house Steps: Mediators' Perceptions of the Stumbling Blocks to Successful Mandated Mediation in
Child Custody and Visitation, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 441 (2011).
12 Pope, supra note 7, at 82-3.
13 N.Y. Pun. HEALTH L. § 2994-c(3)(d).
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In contrast, HEC decisions on certain other matters in New
York and other states are binding. Increasingly, states have been
adopting the optional-mandatory and mandatory-mandatory mod-
els. Such states have been giving HECs certain decision-making
authority. A significant number of states have given HECs one or
more specific authoritative roles: (A) making treatment decisions
for patients without surrogates, (B) adjudicating futility disputes,
(C) adjudicating surrogate "ties," (D) adjudicating other treatment
disputes, and (E) gate-keeping and check-pointing. Furthermore,
even when HECs have not been given any formal authority in one
of these five ways, (F) they still often have substantial de facto
power.
A. Making Treatment Decisions for Patients without Surrogates
A frequent issue confronting HECs is how to make treatment
decisions for i'ncapacitated patients without surrogates. 4 Most
states have developed several processes for making treatment deci-
sions on behalf of patients without decision-making capacity.1 5 But
none of these decision-making mechanisms can help the unrepre-
sented, because they lack advance directive, healthcare agent, and
available friends or family.
Facilities across the United States, and even within a given
state, take varying approaches to this problem. Some facilities per-
mit an attending physician to make the decision."6 Other facilities
require the appointment of a guardian.1 7 Texas law requires the
concurrence of a second physician who is not involved in treatment
of the patient or "who is a representative of an ethics or medical
committee of the healthcare facility."1 8
But some states give HECs broader and more direct authority
for such decisions. For example, Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, and
Tennessee place ethics committees right into the priority list of de-
14 See Thaddeus M. Pope, Medical Decision Making for Patients without Surrogates 369 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1976-78 (2013); Thaddeus Mason Pope & Tanya Sellers, Legal Briefing: The Un-
befriended: Making Healthcare Decisions for Patients without Proxies (Part 1), 23 J. CLINICAL
ETHICS 84 (2012).
15 See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Legal Fundamentals of Surrogate Decision Making, 141 CHEST
1074 (2012).
16 See Thaddeus Mason Pope & Tanya Sellers, Legal Briefing: The Unbefriended: Making
Healthcare Decisions for Patients without Proxies (Part 2), 23 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 177 (2012).
17 Id. at 177-81.
18 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 166.039(e) & 166.088(f).
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fault surrogates.19 If no family member or "close friend" is reason-
ably available, then an ethics committee can be a patient's
surrogate decision maker.
A similar rule in California long-term care facilities permits
treatment decisions for incapacitated patients without surrogates to
be made by an "interdisciplinary team."2 0 Similarly, Iowa estab-
lished a statewide network of "local substitute medical decision-
making boards." 2 1 That law permits a "county board of supervi-
sors" to "appoint and fund a hospital ethics committee to serve as
the local decision-making board." 2 2
In contrast to these states, in which HECs have the decision-
making authority of a regular surrogate, HECs in other states play
a narrower role. Yet, even in these states, the HEC possesses
"veto" authority. Arizona, for example, requires a physician to
consult with and obtain the recommendations of an.ethics commit-
tee.2 3 In Florida, for surrogate-less patients in a persistent vegeta-
tive state, life-prolonging procedures may be withheld or
withdrawn only with approval of a "medical ethics committee. of
the facility where the patient is located." 24
B. Adjudicating Futility Disputes
Like treatment decisions for "unrepresented" or "un-be-
friended" patients, futility disputes also comprise a significant por-
tion of HEC cases.2 5 A medical futility dispute is one in which the
parties disagree over whether a current or proposed medical inter-
19 See Pope & Sellers, supra note 16, at 183-85 (collecting authority).
20 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1418.8. A recently-filed lawsuit challenges the constitu-
tionality of the IDT procedure. California Advocates for Nursing Home reform v. Chapman,
No. RG13700100 (Alameda Cty. Sup. Ct., Cal. Oct. 22, 2013) (filed). But others have defended
the IDT. See e.g., Robert Gibson & James G. Bond, Medical Decision Making in California
Long-Term Care Facilities: Health & Safety Code Section 1418.8. A Mandated Alternative to Con-
servatorship, 19 CAL. TRUSTs & ESTATES Q. 5 (2013).
21 IOWA CODE ANN. § 135.09.
22 IOWA ADMIN. COIE R. 641-85.2(5); Iowa Department of Public Health, Substitute Medi-
cal Decision-Making Board," http://www.idph.state.ia.us/bh/substitute-decision.asp.
23 ARIz. REv. STAT. § 36-3231(B).
24 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.404(2). This committee must conclude: (1) that the condition is
permanent, (2) that there is no reasonable medical probability of recovery, and (3) that with-
holding or withdrawing life-prolonging procedures is in the best interest of the patient.
25 See, e.g., Andrew G. Shuman et al., Clinical Ethics Consultation in Oncology, J. ONCOL-
OGY PRACrICE (2013); T.P. Gonsoulin, A Survey of Louisiana Hospital Ethics Committees, 119
LARYNGOSCOPE 330 (2009).
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vention is medically and ethically appropriate. The paradigmatic
medical futility dispute is one in which the surrogate requests ag-
gressive treatment interventions for an imminently dying or cata-
strophically chronically ill patient. However, that patient's health-
care providers consider such treatment to be non-beneficial or
medically and ethically inappropriate.2 6
Uniquely in Texas, the HEC is the forum of last resort in a
futility dispute. If a Texas physician cannot reach consensus with a
surrogate in a conflict over inappropriate or non-beneficial treat-
ment, then the physician can commence a five-stage review pro-
cess. This process gives the final word to the HEC.27
The first stage entails giving the surrogate at least forty-eight
hours' notice of an HEC meeting.28 Second, the committee re-
views the treating physician's determination. 2 9 Third, if the com-
mittee agrees that the disputed treatment is inappropriate, then the
surrogate is given the committee's written decision." Fourth, the
provider is obligated both to continue providing the disputed treat-
ment for ten days, and to attempt to transfer the patient to another
provider who is willing to comply with the surrogate's treatment
request.31
In the final stage, if the patient has not been transferred, then
the provider may unilaterally stop the disputed treatment on the
eleventh day.32 Providers who follow the Texas law's prescribed
notice and meeting procedures are immune from both disciplinary
action and civil and criminal liability." The decision of the HEC
cannot be challenged or reviewed in court.3 4
Because of either legal requirements or legal uncertainty,
healthcare providers in other states usually cave in to what they
think are medically inappropriate surrogate demands. So there
has been significant interest in copying the Texas law and empow-
ering HECs in futility disputes.
26 Thaddeus M. Pope, Medical Futility Statutes: No Safe Harbor to Unilaterally Stop Life-
Sustaining Treatment, 75 TENN. L. REV. 1, 8-42 (2007).
27 Pope, N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV., supra note 5.





33 TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 166.045.
34 Pope, supra note 26, at 79-80.
35 Thaddeus M. Pope & Ellen Waldman, Mediation at the End-of-Life: Getting Beyond the
Limits of the Talking Cure, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 143 (2007).
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For example, both Idaho and New Jersey have recently consid-
ered adopting the HEC adjudication provisions in the Texas law.
An Idaho bill was passed unanimously by the state Senate, but died
in the House. 3 6 In New Jersey, a joint brief by the New Jersey Hos-
pital Association and the Medical Society of New Jersey asked the
Appellate Division of the state Superior Court to adopt these pro-
visions.3 7 Furthermore, professional medical associations in other
states have passed resolutions calling on their legislatures to em-
power their HECs.
C. Adjudicating Surrogate "Ties"
Futility disputes are not the only type of conflict that HECs
are authorized to adjudicate. Some states have authorized HECs
to decide which of two or more equally "ranked" surrogates can
act as an incapacitated patient's surrogate decision maker.
Because most individuals do not effectively complete advance
directives designating healthcare agents, when patients lose capac-
ity, their surrogate decision maker is typically chosen from the
state's statutory default list.3 9 These statutes specify a priority list
of individuals whom the physician should or must designate. Typi-
cally, at the top of this hierarchy are the patient's spouse, adult
child, parent, and adult sibling. The hierarchy prioritizes those rel-
atives who are typically more likely to know the convictions and
beliefs of the patient and be concerned for the patient.
Sometimes there is conflict among surrogates of the same
class. For example, two daughters may disagree about their
mother's care. With which daughter's decision should clinicians
comply? Ethics committees in all states can help resolve such dis-
putes by facilitating communication and mediation. But in some
states the HEC is not just a mediator, but also an adjudicator.
These HECs are empowered to determine the appropriate surro-
gate. Moreover, these statutes grant clinicians immunity for fol-
lowing the HEC's decision.
36 Idaho S.B. 1114 (60th Legisl.) (passed Senate 3 March 2009).
37 Brief of Amici Curiae New Jersey Hospital Association, Catholic Healthcare Partnership
of New Jersey, and Medical Society of New Jersey, Betancourt v. Trinitas Hospital, No. A-003-
849-08T2 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2009).
38 Pope, N.Y. L. Scai. L. REv., supra note 5.
39 Pope, supra note 15, at 1076.
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For example, in Maryland, if surrogates with equal decision-
making priority disagree about a healthcare decision, then either
an attending physician or one of the default surrogates must refer
the case to the institution's HEC. A physician who acts in accor-
dance with the recommendation of the committee is not subject to
liability for any claim based on lack of consent to or authorization
of the action.4 0
Similarly, a Delaware ethics committee can also decide such
disputes. 41 As in Maryland, the Delaware attending physician, act-
ing in accordance with the committee's recommendation, is not
subject to civil or criminal liability or to discipline for unprofes-
sional conduct. Basically, if two children disagree about a parent's
medical treatment, the HEC can determine which one is the appro-
priate surrogate, and the clinician may safely look to that individ-
ual for consent.
D. Adjudicating Other Disputes42
While some states authorize HECs to adjudicate futility dis-
putes and some authorize HECs to adjudicate surrogate ties, Ha-
waii authorizes HECs to make decisions across a far broader range
of issues: the power of a Hawaii HEC is not limited to any particu-
lar type of issue or dispute.
Hawaii defines an "ethics committee" as "an interdisciplinary
committee appointed by the administrative staff of a licensed hos-
pital, whose function is to consult, educate, review, and make deci-
sions regarding ethical questions, including decisions on life-
sustaining therapy." 43 Moreover, the statute limits review of HEC
decisions by affording immunity: "There shall be no civil liability
for . . . any acts done in the furtherance of the purpose for which
the . . . ethics committee . . . was established."4 4
40 MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE § 5-605(b)(1).
41 DEL. CODE, tit. 16 § 2507(b)(8).
42 HECs may also have authoritative roles with respect to rationing and triage decisions, for
example in disaster situations. See e.g., New York Department of Health, Task Force on Life
and the Law, Allocation of Ventilators in an Influenza Pandemic: Planning Document (Mar. 15,
2007) (suggesting that HECs should serve in an "appeals process" for reviewing triage
decisions), available at http://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/communicable/influenzalpandemic/ven
tilators/docs/ventilator-guidance.pdf.
43 HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-1.7(a) (emphasis added).
44 HAw. REV. STAT. § 663-1.7(b).
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E. Gate-keeping and Check-pointing
The original function of an ethics committee was one of gate-
keeper or checkpoint. Certain healthcare decisions could not be
implemented without consulting (and often without the approval
of) an HEC. For example, the antecedents to today's ethics HECs
served as gatekeepers that would grant or deny permission to per-
form an abortion or conduct research with human subjects.4 5
HECs continue to play this gate-keeping and check-pointing
role. For example, in a Texas mental health facility, behavioral in-
terventions using highly restrictive interventions and aversive tech-
niques such as faradic stimulation (with electric current) require
the documented written approval of an HEC.4 6
But most HEC gatekeeping involves approving the withhold-
ing or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment like ventilators, dial-
ysis, cardiopulmonary resuscitation, and clinically-assisted nutrition
and hydration. HECs play a significant role in these healthcare
decisions in New Jersey, New York, Minnesota, and Massachusetts.
1. New Jersey
In the mid-1990s, the New Jersey Office of the Ombudsman
for the Institutionalized Elderly (OOIE) directed the formation of
a statewide network of "Regional Long Term Care Ethics Commit-
tees" to serve the state's nearly 400 long-term care facilities.4 7
These HECs "provide to the long-term care community expertise
of multi-disciplinary members who offer case consultation and sup-
port to residents and health care professionals who are facing ethi-
cal dilemmas."4 8
While decisions to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment from an elderly, incapacitated resident of a long-term care
facility must normally be reported to the OOIE, the decisions need
not be reported when they have been reviewed by an approved
ethics committee.4 9 In short, while it retains and exercises some
oversight, the OOIE has delegated its oversight and approval re-
sponsibility to the several HECs.
45 See Pope, supra note 2, at 261-65.
46 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 404.166(f).
47 See id.; STATE OF N.J. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN FOR THE INSTITUTIONALIZED ELD-
ERLY, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2006), available at http://www.state.nj.us/publicadvocate/home/
reports/pdfs/elderlyombudsmanreport.pdf.
48 N.J. ADMIN. CODE §§ 10:48B-2.1 & 15A:3-2.2.
49 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 15A:3-2.3(d)(6).
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2. New York
HECs serve three gate-keeping roles in New York. One role
is similar to the function that New Jersey HECs serve for the
OOIE. In a New York residential healthcare facility, a surrogate
has the authority to refuse life-sustaining treatment (other than
cardiopulmonary resuscitation [CPR]) only if the ethics committee
reviews the decision and determines that it meets statutory
standards.50
The other two gate-keeping roles served by New York HECs
are unique to New York. First, an emancipated minor patient with
decision-making capacity has the authority to decide about life-sus-
taining treatment only if an ethics committee approves the deci-
sion. Second, in a general hospital, if an attending physician
objects to a surrogate's decision to withdraw or withhold medically
provided nutrition and hydration, the decision may not be imple-
mented until the ethics review committee reviews the decision and
determines that it meets statutory standards.52
3. Minnesota
Like New Jersey and New York, Minnesota also recently gave
HECs gate-keeping power that was previously exercised by state
government officials. In 2012, a Minnesota probate court held that
court-appointed guardians do not have the authority to consent to
the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment unless
the court specifically grants them that power.53 This was an unex-
pected ruling, because Minnesota guardians had been making such
treatment decisions for decades.
The Hennepin County court had appointed a guardian for Jef-
fers Tschumy in 2008. In April 2012, Tschumy suffered a cardiac
arrest after choking on some food at his group home. This event
resulted in irreversible brain injury that left Tschumy in a persis-
tent vegetative state. Clinicians at Abbott Northwestern Hospital
determined that further medical interventions would not be appro-
priate. The HEC similarly determined that Tschumy could not
benefit from further intensive treatment. Tschumy's guardian
50 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. § 2994-d(5)(B). This determination can alternatively be made by "a
court of competent jurisdiction." Id.
51 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. § 2994-e(3).
52 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH L. § 2994-d(5)(c).
53 In re Tschumy, 27-GC-PR-07-496 (Hennepin Cty. Dist. Ct., Minn. Oct. 18, 2012), available
at http://www.mnbar.org/sections/health-law/12-21-12%20Handout.pdf.
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agreed. But despite this consensus, the hospital filed a motion to
clarify the guardian's authority.5 4
While the court authorized the guardian to consent to the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment, it cautioned that its specific
authorization would always be required. The court explained that
because of the "time gap" between the commencement of a guardi-
anship and the possible need for that guardian to make an end-of-
life decision on behalf of the ward, judges could not "practically
evaluate potential guardians for the ability to make an end-of-life
decision."5 5 Moreover, guardians "rarely (if ever) receive training
on end-of-life issues."56 The court concluded that clinicians must
"involve the judicial system-to provide experienced and impartial
examination and evaluation of termination decisions."5 7
But in 2013, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the dis-
trict court. The appellate court determined that judicial oversight
is unnecessary when a medical ethics committee has already con-
curred with the treatment plan of the ward's physicians.5 8 It
explained:
Although courts are experienced in making reasoned and im-
partial decisions, doctors and medical ethics committees have
the most appropriate knowledge and expertise to evaluate the
potential for a ward's long-term recovery and quality of life and
advising a guardian on end-of-life decisionmaking.5 1
The Court of Appeals endorsed "a private, medically based model
of decisionmaking," 60 holding that HECs, not courts, are the best
checkpoints on guardian decisions to stop life-sustaining treatment.
In October 2013, the Minnesota Supreme Court granted the ward's
petition for review. 61
4. Massachusetts
Like New Jersey, New York, and Minnesota, Massachusetts
also delegated a gate-keeping role to HECs. As in Minnesota, the
issue was prompted by a specific case.
54 Id. at 3.
55 Id. at 15.
56 Id. at 16.
57 Id. at 17.
58 In re Tschumy, 834 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. App. 2013).
59 Id. at 774.
60 Id.
61 In re Tschumy, No. A12-2179 (Minn. Oct. 15, 2013) (Order granting petition for review).
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In 2005, Haleigh Poutre was hospitalized with severe brain in-
juries after she was beaten into a coma by her stepfather, Jason
Strickland. The Department of Social Services assumed custody
for Poutre.6 2 It then moved to terminate Poutre's life support after
physicians declared she was in a persistent vegetative state. The
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court approved this request.6 3
But Poutre's condition then improved. She could breathe on
her own and follow simple commands.64 At least in retrospect, the
decision to stop life support seemed both premature and not in
Poutre's best interest. The case garnered significant negative pub-
licity. The Massachusetts child welfare system came under intense
scrutiny.65 Consequently, new legislation was enacted to address
discovered weaknesses in the system. The new statute provides
that proceedings in end-of-life cases require, among other things, a
"written recommendation from the ethics committee of the hospi-
tal at which the child is a patient." 6 6
F. De Facto Decision Making Power
Even without any official, formal authority, ethics committees
still have significant power. HEC decisions, even if not legally
binding, often have an effect of being practically binding.6 7 There
are three reasons for this. First, families perceive HECs as authori-
tative. Second, even when they recognize the non-binding nature
of HEC decisions, families lack the resources to challenge those
decisions. Third, families recognize that courts grant significant
deference to HEC decisions, even when no such deference is for-
mally required.
62 This department is now called the Department of Children and Families.
63 In re Care and Protection of Sharlene, 445 Mass. 756, 840 N.E. 2d 918 (2006).
64 M. Underwood, Chance of Recovery Rare, but Possible, Says Brain Doc, BOSTON HERALD
(Feb. 28, 2008).
65 Massachusetts Executive Order No. 471, Establishing the Governor's Special Panel for the
Review of the Haleigh Poutre Case (Feb. 3, 2006).
66 MASS. STAT. ch.119 § 38A.
67 See Autumn Fiester, Bioethics Mediation and the End of Clinical Ethics as We Know It, 15
CARDOZO J. CONFLIcr RESOL. 501 (2014) ("ECS are self-deceived in defining their work as
mere 'suggestion' or 'advice.' In practice on the ground, their work is more akin to 'mandate' or
'rendered judgment."').
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1. Families Perceive the HEC as Authoritative
In 2010, the Pennsylvania Attorney General filed a consumer
protection lawsuit against a debt collection company that used de-
ceptive tactics, such as "fake court proceedings," to mislead and
frighten consumers into making payments without following lawful
procedures for debt collection.68
The company had individuals who appeared to be "sheriff
deputies" hand-deliver "hearing notices." These papers sum-
moned consumers to an office at the debt collection company re-
ferred to as "the courtroom," which contained furniture and
decorations similar to those used in actual court offices, including a
witness stand and a raised bench area where a judge would be
seated. Clearly, all of this was designed to mislead and deceive
consumers into thinking that they had no choice but to comply with
the debt collection company's "decisions."
I do not mean to suggest that HECs make deliberate or willful
efforts to disguise themselves as entities more powerful than they
really are. But the misimpression exists nonetheless: patients and
surrogates perceive the HEC as authoritative. 6 9 Here are two re-
cent examples.
68 Erie debt collection company sued, PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, http://
www.attorneygeneral.gov/press.aspxid=5763.
69 See George J. Agich, Authority in Ethics Consultation, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 273, 275
(1995) (observing that recommendations have a "practical effect akin to power"); LISA BELKIN,
FIRST Do No HARM 73 (1992) ("Officially, the committee only gives consultation and advice ...
[but t]he advice is almost always followed."); Ronald E. Cranford & A. Edward Doudera, The
Emergence of Institutional Ethics Committees, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 8, at 5, 16
("[Ilt is hard to believe that a committee's recommendation would not carry weight."); Gonsou-
lin, supra note 26, at 339 ("While HEC recommendations were considered advisory, they were
usually followed by the physicians involved."); BOWEN HOSFORD, BIOETHICS COMMITTEES: THE
HEALTH CARE PROVIDER'S GUIDE 94 (1986) ("It is inescapable that a bioethics committee will
influence physicians' decisions . . . ."); id. at 231 (explaining that HEC "recommendations carry
weight"; "'De facto we are making decisions . . . .' (quoting Ronald Cranford)); id. at 232 ("A
gradual evolution will probably take place, with committees assuming more authority."); id. at
277 (quoting Dr. Norman C. Fost describing HECs as engaged in "de facto decision making"
because they can place "enormous pressures on physicians"); Shelia A.M. McLean, Clinical Eth-
ics Committees, Due Process and the Right to a Fair Hearing, 15 J.L. & MED. 1, 1 (2008) (finding
that HECs are "increasingly authoritative"); Carmel Shachar, Strengthening Clinical Ethics
Committees: An Examination of the Jurisprudence and a Call for Reform, 3 HARV. L. & PoL'Y
REV. 1, 7 (2009) ("[A] patient's family may feel disempowered . . . lack of resources . . . [or
perceive the HEC decision] as authoritative."); Margaret Somerville, The Ethics of Allowing
Babies to Die, MONTREAL GAZETrE, Mar. 25, 2009 ("Ethics committees ... are very influen-
tial."); David N. Sontag, Comment, Are Clinical Ethics Consultants in Danger? An Analysis of
the Potential Legal Liability of Individual Clinical Ethicists, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 667, 700-03
(2002) (discussing causal relationship between HEC decisions and harm caused by medical
negligence).
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For example, in the high-profile Ashley X case, neither the
providers nor the family of Ashley, a severely disabled six-year-old
girl, sought a legally required court order for Ashley's sterilization,
because they thought that HEC approval alone was sufficient. In
2004, Seattle Children's Hospital determined that it was ethically
permissible to perform a hysterectomy and other interventions on
Ashley. The parents and clinicians were in agreement, and the in-
terventions were performed.
But in 2006, the Washington Protection and Advocacy System
(WPAS)o investigated the hospital." WPAS concluded that the
surgery violated Ashley's constitutional and common law rights,
because Washington courts had ruled earlier that sterilization of a
developmentally disabled person requires court approval. Court
approval was never sought in Ashley's case, in large part because
HEC review and approval was thought to be sufficient.72
Similarly, in a Montreal case, a patient's family thought that
the HEC had more power than it actually did.73 The parents of a
severely disabled girl, Phebe Mantha, decided to take her off life
support. Phebe's treatment providers agreed. But the HEC dis-
agreed. The parents reluctantly acceded to the HEC.
But the parents agreed to continue life support only because
they thought they had no choice. They thought (wrongly) that they
needed the HEC's "permission" to stop treatment. Phebe was
later discharged and is being cared for at home with substantial
medical support. The parents brought a $3.5 million lawsuit
against the hospital, complaining about its failure to disclose the
HEC's merely advisory status. The parents claim that the HEC
should have informed them that it actually had no decision-making
power.
2. Families Lack Resources to Challenge HECs
The (mis)perception of HECs as authoritative is not the only
reason that HECs have de facto power. Even if patients and surro-
gates recognize that an HEC's decision is non-binding, they may
70 WPAC is now called Disability Rights Washington.
71 WASHINGTON PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY SYSTEM, INVESTIGATIVE REPORT REGARD-
ING THE "ASHLEY TREATMENT" (May 8, 2007), http://www.disabilityrightswa.org/home/Full
ReportInvestigativeReportRegardingtheAshleyTreatment.pdf.
72 Douglas S. Diekema and Norman Fost, Ashley Revisited: A Response to the Critics, 10(1)
AM J. BIOETHIcS 30 (2010).
73 Laurendeau v. LaSalle Hosp., No. 500-17-048988-094 (Quebec Sup. Ct. Mar. 12, 2009)
(filed); see also C. Lewis, Hospital Sued for Keeping Infant Alive, NATIONAL POST (Mar. 14,
2009).
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still accede to an HEC-rendered decision with which they disagree.
A challenge to the HEC may require a lawsuit. Many patients and
families lack the sophistication and resources to initiate litigation
against healthcare providers.7 4 And the confidentiality afforded to
HEC records and proceedings presents additional obstacles. 75
3. Courts Defer to HEC Recommendations
Furthermore, patients and surrogates know that even if they
did challenge the HEC, the court would probably defer to the
HEC's supposed expertise. Recognizing that decisions to withdraw
life-sustaining treatment would be frequent and routine, courts
have wisely determined that such decisions could and should be
made without judicial review."' Judges do not want to decide these
cases.7 7 Moreover, the general consensus has been that there is no
need for judicial review78 because HECs are both better positioned
and better equipped to resolve treatment disputes.
74 Cf. Keren Ladin & Douglas W. Hanto, Rationing Lung Transplants - Procedural Fair-
ness in Allocation and Appeals, 369 NEw ENG. J. MED. 599 (2013). For similar reasons, most
patients injured by medical malpractice never sue. See Alan G. Williams, The Cure for What
Ails: A Realistic Remedy for the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 23 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 473
(2011). Some HECs have offered to equalize the power differential by paying for the family's
attorney. See, e.g., Lance Lightfoot, Incompetent Decisonmakers and Withdrawal of Life-Sus-
taining Treatment: A Case Study, 33 J. L. MED. & ETHICs 851 (2005).
75 See Pope, supra note 7, at 85.
76 See generally ALAN MEISEL & KATHY L. CERMINARA, THE RIGHT To DIE: THE LAW OF
END-OF-LIFE DECISIONMAKING §§ 3.19-.20, .23, .26 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2012) (collecting rele-
vant authority).
77 See, e.g., In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1237 n.2 (D.C. 1990) ("[I]t would be far better if
judges were not called to patients' bedsides . . . . Because judgment in such a case involves
complex medical and ethical issues as well as the application of legal principles, we would urge
the establishment . . . of another tribunal to make these decisions . . . ."); In re Nemser, 273
N.Y.S.2d 624, 629 (N.Y. 1966) ("[I]n no way does [this] court intend to imply that an individual
must be judicially declared incompetent before it will or may intervene in his or her behalf....
It seems incongruous in light of the physicians' oath that they even seek legal immunity prior to
action necessary to sustain life. . . . Emergency requirements . . . should not be delayed nor the
responsibility therefor shirked while fearful physicians and hospitals first seek judicial
sanction . . . .").
78 See MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 76, at § 3.19 n.265.
79 Id at § 3.25(a); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and Risks of Privatization of Justice
through ADR, 11 OHIo ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 241, 289-90 (1996) (arguing that bioethics dis-
putes are "probably better resolved privately"). This general position has been challenged most
forcefully by Professor Robin Fretwell Wilson, of Washington and Lee University School of Law.
See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Hospital Ethics Committees as the Forum of Last Resort: An Idea
Whose Time Has Not Come, 76 N.C. L. REV. 353 (1998); Robin Fretwell Wilson, Rethinking the
Shield of Immunity: Should Ethics Committees Be Accountable for Their Mistakes?, 14 HEC
FORUM 172, 187-88 (2002) (stating that judges have resolved highly technical cases and stressing
the benefits of court proceedings).
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Judicial review is generally thought to be an inappropriate
mechanism for resolving medical treatment disputes."o First, it is
cumbersome, being both time-consuming and expensive.8 ' Thus, it
cannot usefully address complex, urgent medical issues. Second,
because courts are adversarial and open to the public, they are an
unwelcome forum in which to resolve sensitive medical treatment
disputes worthy of privacy. 82 Third, judicial review is an encroach-
ment on the medical profession's decision making."
In contrast, the responses of ethics committees are "more
rapid and sensitive" and "closer to the treatment setting. "84
"[T]heir deliberations are informal and typically private,"8 5 which
is important for medical decisions and the informal resolution of
disputes.86 And ethics committees better respect the role and judg-
ment of physicians.
Courts themselves recognize these comparative strengths and
weaknesses. While they remain open to resolving intractable dis-
putes, courts have shown a willingness to consider the role and ca-
pabilities of the HEC, as well as the substance of its
recommendations, as having a significant impact on the final re-
so MEISEL & CERMINARA, supra note 76, at § 3.26. Bear in mind that ethics committees may
be considered, and evaluated, as another form of alternative dispute resolution. They offer most
of the same benefits: speed, low cost, ease of access, informality, and confidentiality.
81 See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MED. & BIOMEDI-
CAL & BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT: ETHICAL,
MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 159 (1983) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S
COMM'N] (describing court involvement with treatment disputes as intrusive, slow, costly and
framed in adversarial terms). In futility disputes, for example, courts typically issue a temporary
injunction ordering continued treatment pending a full evidentiary hearing; but the patient often
dies in the meantime, mooting the dispute. See Thaddeus Mason Pope, Involuntary Passive Eu-
thanasia in U.S. Courts: Reassessing the Judicial Treatment of Medical Futility Cases, 9 MARQ.
ELDER'S ADVISOR 229 (2008). Requiring judicial review for approval of treatment decisions
may, because of the required time and expense, effectively deny a right to such treatment. See,
e.g., Mike E. Jorgensen, Today Is the Day We Free Electroconvulsive Therapy? 12 QUINN.
HEALTH L.J. 1, 1, 56 (2008).
82 See Alice Herb & Eliot J. Lazar, Ethics Committees and End-of-Life Decision Making, in
MEDICAL FUTILITY AND THE EVALUATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING INTERVENTIONS 110, 110, 111
(Marjorie B. Zucker & Howard D. Zucker eds., 1997).
83 See Wilson, supra note 79.
84 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 81, at 169.
85 Id.
86 See In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 451 (N.J. 1987) (stating that "committee review can be more
sensitive, prompt, and discreet" than judicial review); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 81, at
165 (observing that "ethics committees will probably be less formal and burdensome than judi-
cial review in any particular case").
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sult.87 Thus, it appears HECs significantly influence-and some-
times control-the outcome. 8
G. Summary of Growing HEC Power
Increasingly, state legislatures, agencies, and courts have en-
dowed HECs with three types of decision-making authority. First,
today's HECs have more adjudicatory power to resolve futility dis-
putes, surrogate ties, and other treatment conflicts. Second, to-
day's HECs have the power to make decisions for unbefriended
patients. Third, today's HECs have the authority to act as gate-
keepers and checkpoints, especially for decisions regarding life-sus-
taining treatment. Furthermore, HEC power has grown because of
not only expanded roles officially delegated by state governments,
but also greater deference from the courts. Even when they lack
de jure power, HECs often have de facto power.
III. DUE PROCESS PROBLEMS
The primary purpose of this article is neither to identify nor to
argue for the due process problems with HECs. That task has al-
ready been substantially performed.8 9 Instead, the primary mission
87 See, e.g., Bernstein v. Sup. Ct., No. B212067, at 21 (Cal. App. Feb. 2, 2009); Quill v. Vacco,
80 F.3d 716, 731 n.4 (2d Cir. 1996) (suggesting states allowing assisted suicide might "require the
establishment of local ethics committees as resources for physicians faced with questions relating
to requests for lethal medications"), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Severns v. Wilmington Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 421 A.2d 1334, 1341-44 (Del. 1980); In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. 1990); DeGrella v.
Elston, 858 S.W.2d 698, 710 (Ky. 1993); In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115, 120 (Mass. 1980) ("[T]he
concurrence of qualified consultants may be highly persuasive . . . ."); Superintendent of
Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 429 (Mass. 1977); In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d
332, 336 n.2 (Minn. 1984) ("[T]hese committees are uniquely suited to provide guidance . . . .");
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d at 463-64; In re Moorhouse, 593 A.2d 1256, 1257 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1991); In re Doe, 45 Pa. D. & C.3d 371 (C.C.P. 1987); In re L.W., 482 N.W.2d 60, 63-4 (Wis.
1992); see also BETHANY SPIELMAN, BIOETHICS IN LAw 41-56 (2007); Alexander M. Capron,
Legal Perspectives on Institutional Ethics Committees, 11 J.C. & U.L. 416 (1985). In some re-
spects, HECs are analogous to medical review panels in the liability context. While the decisions
of neither forum typically are formally dispositive, they have significant practical effect. Cf
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 519-B:1 (2008).
88 On the other hand, courts may grant less deference when they perceive the HEC to lack
independence and competence. See, e.g., Inquest into the death of Paulo Melo [2008] NTMC
080; Pope, supra note 2, at 299.
89 See, e.g., Pope, supra note 2; Nora O'Callaghan, Dying for Due Process: The Unconstitu-
tional Medical Futility Provision of the Texas Advance Directives Act, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 527
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of the article is to demonstrate the increasing relevance and impor-
tance of these already-articulated due process problems. They
matter more, because HECs matter more.
In prior work, I have described four distinct types of risks ap-
plicable to HEC decisions: the risk of corruption, the risk of bias,
the risk of arbitrariness, and the risk of carelessness.9 0 I will not
revisit that discussion here. But while all these risks materially in-
crease the chance of error, the risk of corruption may be the most
significant.91 Accordingly, I separately address this particular risk
below.
A. Bias, Arbitrariness, and Carelessness
A "biased decision" is one reflecting a pattern of unfairness,
which disparages the interests of certain persons or classes of per-
sons.9 2 For example, a treatment decision may be biased when the
decision maker is prejudiced against the race of the patient.9 3
A "careless decision" is one based on ill-considered or unsup-
ported beliefs due to insufficiencies in the decision maker's train-
ing.94 For example, a treatment decision may be careless when the
decision maker misapplies relevant standards, such as those for de-
termining capacity. 95
An "arbitrary decision" is one that is the product of an abuse
of appropriate process norms.9 6 For example, a treatment decision
may be arbitrary when the decision maker fails to obtain relevant
information or engage in adequate deliberation.9 7
(2008); Nora O'Callaghan, When Atlas Shrugs: May the State Wash Its Hands of Those in Need of
Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment? 18 HEALTH MATRIx 291 (2008).
90 Pope, supra note 2.
91 Cf Jennifer E. Miller & William English, Corruption, in Handbook of Global Bioethics
599 (H.A.M.J. ten Have & B. Gardijn eds. 2014).
92 Pope, supra note 2, at 274-75.
93 For examples of HEC bias, see Pope, supra note 2 nn.153-186 & accompanying text.
94 Id. at 274-75.
95 For examples of HEC carelessness, see Pope, supra note 2 nn.187-219 & accompanying
text.
96 Id. at 274-75.
97 For examples of HEC arbitrariness, see Pope, supra note 2 nn.220-235 & accompanying
text.
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B. Corruption and Conflict of Interest
A "corrupted decision" is one driven by the self-interest of the
decision maker." For example, a treatment decision may be cor-
rupted when the decision maker has a financial interest in the
outcome.
Ideally, HECs are independent and neutral forums. After all,
their purpose is to provide a perspective broader than that of the
clinical team involved in the patient's treatment. The American
Medical Association advises that "[c]ommittee members should
not have other responsibilities that are likely to prove incompatible
with their duties as members of the ethics committee." 99 The Uni-
versal Declaration of Bioethics states that to "provide advice on
ethical problems in clinical settings," HECs should be "indepen-
dent, multidisciplinary, and pluralist." 100
But the objectivity of HECs is seriously compromised. 01
Structural factors inhibit their ability to act impartially. Because
most members of an intramural HEC work for the institution, they
have a conflict of interest when adjudicating disputes in which the
institution has a stake. This insider composition corrupts the
HEC's decisions. 10 2
Most (and often all) members of HECs are employed directly
or indirectly by the very institution in which the committee is situ-
ated. As a result of this economic dependence, the committee
members may act out of a sense of duty to the institution. "As an
institutional player, an HEC may internalize and perpetuate the
interests and biases of its parent hospital."' Therefore, HECs
may not promote patient interests that conflict with institutional
interests.
98 Id. at 274-75; see also id. at 276-87.
99 AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHIcs Opinion 9.11.
too UNITED NATIONS, EDUC., SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORG., UNIVERSAL DECLARATION ON
BIOETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS, at art. 19, U.N. Doc. SHS/EST/BIO/06/1 (2005), available at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001461/146180E.pdf.
101 I am not here providing a knock-down, drag-out argument for this assertion. My primary
objective is to demonstrate a trend toward increased and expanded decision-making roles for
HECs. Establishing this shift in function highlights the urgency of addressing due process
problems that have already been articulated.
102 Pope, supra note 2 nn. 96-151.
103 Robert G. Wilson & Thomas G. Gallegos, The Community Bioethics Committee: A
Unique Pathway Out of Bioethical Dilemmas, 4 HEC FORUM 372, 382 (1992).
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1. Four Examples of HEC Corruption
Indeed, this risk is not just theoretical. HECs often get
pressed into serving the institution's financial goals, mainly in
avoiding uncompensated care and liability exposure. Many ethics
committees in fact deliberately aim to serve a risk-management
role for the institution. This should not be surprising, considering
that HECs often include institutional risk managers and lawyers,
and that the very creation of such committees was motivated in
part by a need for legal protection. Here are just four examples.
First, in In re Edna M.F., the sister (who was also the guard-
ian) of a 71-year-old severely demented patient sought HEC re-
view of her decision to withdraw the patient's feeding tube.104
Fulfillment of the patient's wishes or best interests, not consensus,
is the appropriate healthcare decision-making standard. But in
conducting this review, the HEC abandoned the procedures it
should have followed.
"The committee seemed to understand that its function was to
reach a determination that would insulate the facility from legal
liability." 0 So, the HEC agreed to the withdrawal of the feeding
tube only if no family member objected. One did object, so the
HEC disallowed the withdrawal, even though it was likely in the
patient's best interest. Wisconsin Chief Justice Abrahamson wrote
a special concurring opinion criticizing the HEC for its marked in-
stitutional bias.
Second, the very day after the insurance of comatose three-
year-old Brianna Rideout was exhausted, the Hershey Medical
Center HEC authorized the unilateral withdrawal of her ventilator
over her parent's vehement objections. 0 6 The hospital denied that
resources or the financial cost of caring for Brianna factored into
the medical decisions. But in addition to the suspicious timing, the
medical records showed notations that Brianna's insurance was
running out.10
Third, more recently, Kalilah Roberson-Reese underwent a
Cesarean section at Houston's Memorial Hermann Hospital. But
amniotic fluid began to leak into her lungs, forcing providers to put
her on a ventilator. Later, her tracheal tube fell out and she went
104 In re Edna M.F., 563 N.W.2d 485, 495-96 (Wis. 1997).
105 Id. at 496.
106 Rideout v. Hershey Med. Ctr., 30 Pa. D. & C.4th 57 (C.C.P. 1995).
107 Frank Bruni, A Fight over a Baby's Death and Dignity, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1996, at A6;
Alison Delsite, Suit against Hershey Raises Touchy Questions, THE PATRIOT, Mar. 8, 1996, at
Al.
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without oxygen for twenty minutes, which caused serious brain
damage. Within days, the hospital initiated Texas's statutory pro-
cess by which, with approval of the HEC, providers could withdraw
life-sustaining treatment, even over family objections. But again,
the HEC was conflicted: the patient had exhausted her Medicaid
benefits and it appeared that the hospital was trying to "bury mis-
takes" and avoid exposure to both liability and uncompensated
treatment.1 0 8
Fourth, in yet another medical futility case, in New Jersey,
there was again evidence that the ethics committee was motivated
by the desire to limit both malpractice exposure and uncompen-
sated treatment. After a medical error left Ruben Betancourt in a
vegetative state, the HEC at New Jersey's Trinitas Hospital deter-
mined that continued dialysis would be medically and ethically in-
appropriate. This review was apparently driven by money, not by
medicine. This was not a bottom-up process, where the bedside
physician sees bad care and then seeks the support of the adminis-
tration. This was top-down. Even the CEO was involved. The
Medical Director testified that the administration was fully aware
of Ruben Betancourt: "Would they like him transferred? I'm sure
they would." First, Mr. Betancourt had a huge unpaid bill.109 Sec-
ond, there was a pending malpractice action, the value of which
would be far less if Mr. Betancourt were dead.
Mr. Betancourt's family obtained an injunction ordering the
hospital to continue dialysis.1"o The hospital appealed that order,
and asked the appellate division to defer to the determination of its
ethics committee.11' The court refused, specifically citing both the
"anticipated medical malpractice action" and the hospital's "expo-
108 Todd Ackerman, Texas' Patient Care Law at Hub of Houston Dispute, Hous. CHRON.,
July 9, 2006, at Al.
109 As the cost of Mr. Betancourt's treatment was approaching nearly $2 million, the hospital
realized that it would be able to recover only a portion from Medicare. Trial Transcript
10:23-11:2 (Jan. 22, 2009) ("[Tlhere may be other economic motivation. There is a sizable medi-
cal bill that remains unpaid."), available at http://thaddeuspope.com/images/Transcript-order-to
_show cause.hearings_1.22.09,_2.17.09_2.23.09.pdf.
110 Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., No. C-12-09 (N.J. Super. Mar. 4, 2009) (Malone, J.).
Ill Brief and Appendix on Behalf of Appellant, Trinitas Hospital (May 29, 2009), available at
http://thaddeuspope.com/images/Defendant-s-merit brief 05-28-09.pdf. An amicus brief asked
the court to adopt a prospective rule requiring judicial deference to HECs. Brief and Appendix
of Amici Curiae New Jersey Hospital Association, Catholic Healthcare Partnership of New
Jersey, and Medical Society of New Jersey 54-64 (Aug. 7, 2009), available at http://thaddeuspope
.com/images[BetancourtNJHACHPMSNJamicussmall.pdf.
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sure to negative financial impact" since Mr. Betancourt's "'sizable'
hospital bill remained unpaid." 1 12
2. Other HEC Corruption
HECs may be beholden to not only their respective institu-
tions, but also the individual physicians who refer the cases to the
committee. The repeat-player phenomenon provides that the party
that negotiates many disputes (hospitals) will have greater experi-
ence with and exposure to the process than the party that typically
negotiates just one dispute (patient, surrogates). Eager to maintain
relationships with physicians, committees over-identify with their
interests.
Indeed, the same corruption and conflict-of-interest problems
plague the close cousin of the intramural HEC, the intramural IRB
that approves research with human subjects. IRB members are
conflicted for three main reasons. First, the investigator's research
grants may affect both the IRB members' own compensation and
the prestige of their institution. Second, members review the pro-
posals of colleagues and friends. Third, members know that their
own proposals will be reviewed and the rules extracted from their
review decisions will be applied to review of their own research
protocols.
Because of this "built-in self-interest," IRBs "are often
friendly regulators."" 3 Famously, in Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger
Institute, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that IRBs have a
conflict of interest because they are committees of the very re-
search institute that they are charged to oversee. 1 14 The IRB at
issue in Grimes had approved research exposing small children to
risks of lead poisoning while offering those same children no pros-
pect of direct medical benefit.
In sum, HECs are creatures of the healthcare institutions in
which they are situated. Because, in many treatment disputes, the
interests of the institution may not align with those of the patient,
HECs cannot act as sufficiently impartial, independent decision
makers. They serve "two sets of masters.""' Susan Wolf states
that "to ask institutional committees dominated by caregivers to be
112 Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp., 1 A.3d 823, 832 (N.J. Super. A.D. 2010).
113 Leonard H. Glantz, Contrasting Institutional Review Boards with Institutional Ethics Com-
mittees, in CRANFORD & DOUDERA, supra note 8, at 129, 131.
114 782 A.2d 807 (Md. 2001).
115 Susan M. Wolf, Ethics Committees and Due Process: Nesting Rights in a Community of
Caring, 50 MD. L. REv. 798, 819, 820 (1991).
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the guardians of patients' rights and interests is like asking the fox
to guard the chicken coop."' 16 As if an actual lack of neutrality
were not bad enough, moreover, the perception of bias creates
among patients and families "serious suspicions of complicity, rub-
ber-stamping, or cover-up. "117
IV. CONCLUSION
State legislatures, courts, and agencies are increasingly dele-
gating adjudicatory and gate-keeping roles to HECs. As HECs get
more power and authority, the quality and integrity of their deci-
sion-making processes should improve. Form should follow func-
tion. There should be a direct and positive correlation between
due process and authority.
But this has not happened. The fairness and legitimacy of
HEC procedures has not improved. HEC decisions are at substan-
tial risk of making decisions tainted by corruption, bias, careless-
ness, and arbitrariness. Given the stakes (often life and death), the
risk of error is too great. Policymakers must attend to the design of
HECs to mitigate these risks.
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